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Abstract:  The Baltic countries’ struggle was for independence more than any other thing. 
The achievement of democracy was a by-product of the secessionist project of increasing 
autonomy  from  Moscow.  A possible  explanation  for  this  could  be  that  representative 
democracy became an implicit and obvious ideal regime for the elites and local populations. 
As for the successes of the independence movements in the Baltic countries, five crucial 
events paved the way for independence as the only exit strategy for the Baltic SSRs. First, 
Gorbachev promoted the  mobilization  of  civil  society,  expecting  support  for  his  reform 
program, but miscalculating the relevance of nationalism for the Soviet Republics. Second, 
after  mobilization  had become widespread,  Gorbachev lost  the  opportunity to  build  the 
USSR as a confederation because he refused to accept that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
was illegal. Third, this issue, plus the failure of attempts to repress mobilizations, led to 
increased  unification among all  the  mobilized sectors,  in  turn leading to  a  two-million-
strong human chain protest. Fourth, the first multiparty elections in the Baltic countries saw 
a  clear  majority  support  the  pro-independence  groups,  allowing  for  a  quick  and 
institutionalized process of secession. Finally, after the failed coup against Gorbachev the 
project of a voluntary federation collapsed, making independence a  de jure fact since the 
correlation of power favoured Yeltsin’s decentralization model.
Keywords:  democratization,  secessionist  movement,  human rights  organization,  Popular 
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Introduction
The Baltic countries’ struggle was for independence more than any other thing. 
The achievement of democracy was a by-product of the secessionist project of 
increasing  autonomy  from  Moscow.  The  wave  of  protests  that  led  to  the 
independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was a result of the opening of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) regime to dissent, since Mikhail 
Gorbachev  miscalculated  that  these  mobilizations  would  support  his  reform 
program (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 46-47; Lane, 2001: 96; etc.). Contrary to his 
expectations,  “...  the failure  of  the regime to prevent specific  mobilizational 
challenges gave rise to new challenges by other groups. [Later on, the] Conflict 
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within the leadership of the state [in Moscow] and the success of some protest 
acts evoked a more serious explosion of public expectations –an amplification 
of demands from relatively benign concerns to issues more directly challenging 
the parameters of the national order” (Beissinger, 2002: 68).
Periodization
The independence  movements  in  the  Baltic  countries  were  part  of  a  bigger 
nationalist process that had emerged within the USSR and was facilitated by 
Gorbachev’s  policy  of  glasnost’.  Glasnost’  reduced  the  tight  control  of 
information  coming  from  the  west,  allowed  –and  promoted-  civil  society 
mobilization, and was associated with a series of economic reforms that aimed 
at improving the efficiency of the economy –the perestroika. This opening was 
decided in June 1988 during the USSR’s 19th Communist Party Conference, and 
represented  a  unique  opportunity  for  the  Baltic  countries  to  claim  further 
autonomy (Smith, 1994a; Beissinger, 2002).
The  transition  process  in  Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Estonia,  according  to 
Runcis (1999: 38), “...  has four components: (1) political transformation; (2) 
transition  to  market  economy;  (3)  creation  of  an  independent  state;  and (4) 
preservation of independence.” Those few who consider that the Baltic struggle 
was one for democratization date the end of this process with the elections to 
the transitional State Councils in 1992 (Ruus, 1999: 23; Kaldor and Vejvoda, 
1999;  Dawisha  and  Parrott,  1997).  All  others  date  it  in  line  with  the 
Independence  Declarations  of  1990  (Beissinger,  2002;  Smith,  1994a,  2001; 
Lieven, 1994; Pabriks and Purs, 2001; Lane, 2001; etc.).
The  Baltic  SSRs  were  early  risers  in  a  general  wave  of  nationalist 
mobilizations within the USSR that were a result  of the opening of political 
opportunities for expressing dissent generated by the glasnost’ reform program. 
In  addition,  in  the  specific  case  of  the  Baltic  SSR,  higher  degrees  of 
coordination  were  achieved  due  to  long  traditions  of  resistance  to  Soviet 
occupation, the existence of links with the west (in Estonia), an active diaspora, 
a supportive Catholic Church (in Lithuania) and a nationalist population (in all 
three cases).  Finally, the diffusion processes among the three countries were 
quick and effective due to the long-standing links among the three states. 
Resistance peri  od (1965-1986)  
Even though the majority of the population had accepted Soviet rule since the 
1950s, the Baltic Socialist Soviet Republics (SSRs) were among the few –along 
with Western Ukraine – that had some relevant experience of resistance during 
the Soviet period. According to Beissinger (2002: 54, n. 8), these mobilizations 
aimed  at  secession:  “Out  of  185  mass  demonstrations  identified  with  100 
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participants or more that took place in the USSR between 1965 and 1986, only 
20 raised the issue of secession, and all of these were located in the Baltics. The 
largest occurred in Vilnius on October 10, 1977, in the aftermath of a soccer 
game and included from ten to fifteen thousand participants...  Before August 
1987  only  four  other  secessionist  demonstrations  mobilized  more  than  a 
thousand participants: May 18, 1972, in Kaunas; November 1, 1975, in Vilnius; 
October 1, 1980, in Tallinn; and October 26, 1980, in Trakai, Lithuania”.
In Lithuania the Catholic Church was the main organization involved in 
resistance to Moscow’s policies of sovietisation. In 1972, The Chronicle of the  
Catholic Church in Lithuania began1, a publication denouncing human rights 
violations  in  the  country.  It  was  printed  without  interruption  until  1988 
(Krickus, 1997) with the support of the Vatican (since the papacy of John Paul 
II),  the  Lithuanian  diaspora  in  the  United  States  and  some  intellectuals  in 
Moscow, such as Andrei Sakharow and Sergei Kovalev (Lane, 2001: 89-90). 
However central the Catholic Church during this period, Shtromas (1994, 
115,  n.  40) recalls  other  contentious events  unrelated to the more organized 
struggle of the Catholic Church: 
“Another mass manifestation that developed into a full-scale riot took place in 
Kaunas  in  1960,  during  the  festivities  devoted  to  the  20th anniversary  of 
Lithuania’s sovietisation. On that occasion militia forces started shooting at the 
demonstrators, killing and wounding several people, which outraged the crowds 
to such an extent that they attacked and smashed the forces of law and order 
present in the city.  Two more such mass demonstrations that developed into 
riots  took place in Lithuania.  One, in May 1972, was the result  of the self-
immolation in the central square of Kaunas ‘for the freedom of Lithuania’ of a 
young student, Romas Kalanta; it was his funeral on 18 May 1972, that turned 
into a demonstration that literally took over the city and held it for almost two 
days, until the troops were sent in to disperse it. More than five hundreds arrests 
were made. The other, in October 1977, developed from a soccer match played 
in  Vilnius  between  the  local  team  and  a  team  from  the  Russian  town  of 
Smolensk.  On  all  occasions  the  overriding  slogans  were  ‘Freedom  for 
Lithuania’ and ‘Russians out of our country’.”
In addition to the Catholic Church, there were two other important resistance 
coalitions in Lithuania. The first was the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, founded in 
1979 and one of many similar groups that emerged across the USSR in that 
period. The coalition was unable to organize relevant mobilizations because it 
was severely repressed, losing all its members by 1982. The second coalition 
was the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Catholics, founded in 1980, 
and which collected 46,905 signatures against the trials of its leaders, Father 
1 This was not the only samizdat publication. Ausra, a secular publication that had been in print 
since 1975, was another. In addition, there were at least nine other Catholic samizdat publications in 
circulation during the 1970s-1980s (Shtromas, 1994: 104-105; Lane, 2001: 91-92).
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Alfonsas Svarinskas and Father Sigitas Tamkevičius,  condemned to exile for 
anti-Soviet propaganda, in 1982 (Shtromas, 1994: 103-104).
In Estonia, the 1970s-1980s saw an escalation in independence claims by 
dissident groups. An appeal for the restoration of Estonia’s independence was 
presented in the United Nations, and in October 1980 the “Letter of the Forty”, 
an open letter to three Soviet newspapers by 40 leading Estonian intellectuals 
condemning the repression of university students and calling for policies to stop 
the decline of Estonian language usage in the SSR was published (Vardys, 1981; 
Raun, 1997: 341). There was no massive repression, but some dissidents were 
killed in this period. The most well-known case is that of Jüri Kukk, killed in a 
labour camp in March 1981 after being forced to eat while on hunger strike 
(Taagepera, 1984). Shtromas (1994: 115-116, n. 40) recalls the main contentious 
events as follows: 
“In Estonia a mass protest took place in the capital city Tallinn. It started as a 
result  of  the  televised  hockey  world  championship.  When  the  Czech  team 
defeated the Soviet team, hundreds of people, mainly students, burst onto the 
streets  shouting  “we  won”.  Mass  youth  demonstrations  took  place  in  Tartu 
(Estonia) in 1976 and in Liepaja (Latvia) in 1977 over pop music events. The 
most significant Estonian youth demonstrations took place in Tallinn, Tartu, and 
some other places in October 1980 over the issue of increased time allocation to 
Russian lessons in Estonian schools. Subsequently, a letter from 40 prominent 
Estonian intellectuals expressed their  full  solidarity with and support for the 
demonstrators,  who were  extremely brutally  dealt  with  by militia  and army 
troops”.
There were several main resistance social movement organizations in Estonia. 
The first, the Estonian Democratic Movement and the Estonian National Front, 
emerged in 1972. In 1974 the Estonian Patriots was created and in 1976 the 
Association of Concerned Estonians replaced the Estonian Patriots after they 
were  crushed  by  the  authorities.  In  1978,  two  new  social  movement 
organizations were created: the White Key Brotherhood and Maarjamaa, both 
mainly concerned with cultural freedom. All these organizations were founding 
members  of  the  Estonian  Popular  Front  in  1987-1988  which  later  led  the 
struggle  for  independence.  In  addition,  four  samizdat  periodicals  had  been 
published  in  Estonia  since  1971  (in  Estonian:  Eestri  Democraat,  Eesti  
Rahvuslik  Hääl,  Poolpäevaleht,  and  in  Russian:  Luch  Svodoby)  (Shtromas, 
1994: 104-105).
Estonia’s resistance movements survived because of a detail that marked 
the country out from the other two Baltic countries. Since 1965 Estonia had 
enjoyed a unique privilege within the USSR that allowed it to have contact with 
Finland, to receive tourists from that country and for Estonians to travel there by 
a  regular  boat  connection  between  Tallinn  and  Helsinki.  The  connection 
between Tallinn and Helsinki was unusual for the USSR in several ways:
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“Finnish tourists  brought  Western  newspapers  and literature,  including some 
works  by  Estonian  exile  writers  living  in  the  West.  Academics  and  other 
intellectuals were able to establish contacts with colleagues in Finland and were 
often  able  to  keep abreast  of  developments  in  their  field in  the West.  Most 
importantly, Finnish television was available in the northern third of Estonia, 
providing daily access to Western news reports and programming. The Estonian 
and Finnish languages are linguistically close enough that a native speaker of 
Estonian can gain at least a passive knowledge of Finnish by very little effort” 
(Raun, 1997: 342).
In Latvia, the situation was very different. There were no contacts with the west 
and, since 1965, the only relevant resistance movements were run by émigré 
Latvians.  One of  the main  reasons  for  this  dissimilar  situation was that  the 
Soviet military presence in Latvia was much higher than in any other Baltic 
SSR. The headquarters of the Baltic Military District was in Riga. In addition, 
Latvians formed only slightly over half of the population in the country, which 
had the highest percentage of Russian migrants in the Baltic region (Plakans, 
1997: 254-255). However, there were a few social movement organizations in 
Latvia,  created  in  1975  (the  Latvian  Independence  Movement,  Latvia’s 
Democratic  Youth  Committee,  and  Latvia’s  Christian  Democratic 
Organization). As Shtromas (1994: 104) puts it: “By 1976 they started to co-
ordinate their activities and issued joint statements addressed to the government 
of the Latvian SSR, the Australian prime minister (Malcolm Fraser), and others. 
Another,  more  activist  body,  the  Organization  for  Latvia’s  Independence, 
organized throughout the 1970s and the 1980s various protest actions, petitions, 
and demands”. Finally, there were no samizdat publications in Latvia. Thus, the 
resistance period in Latvia was not comparable to that of Lithuania –with its 
active  Catholic  Church  coordinating  several  actions  against  the  regime-  or 
Estonia –with a whole network of dissidents both inside and outside the country.
The first  cross-Baltic coordinated actions involving all  these resistance 
coalitions, social movement organizations and networks were carried out on the 
40th Anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact2. On August 29th, 1979 a joint 
petition by the three Baltic SSRs was issued in Moscow demanding the end of 
the Russia-Germany agreement assigning the Baltic States to the USSR. It was 
the  emergence  of  this  network  in  1987-1991  that  pushed  the  nationalist 
awakening into a pro-independence movement (Shtromas, 1994: 105-106).
First stage: nationalist awakening   (1986-1988) 
From 1986 to 1988 there was a national awakening in the Baltic SSRs as a 
result  of  the  Tartar  example  and  the  openness  produced  by  Gorbachev’s 
glasnost’  program.  The  struggle  for  independence  (and  by  default  also 
2 Cf. Kirby (1994) on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its implications for Baltic history.
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democratization)  of  the  Baltic  SSRs  was  part  of  a  cycle  of  nationalist 
mobilization that started in the summer of 1987 when Crimean Tartars exiled in 
Uzbekistan took their nationalist claims to Red Square in Moscow (Beissinger, 
2012:  61-62).  The  opening  of  political  opportunities  for  nationalist  claims 
produced by the Crimean Tartars led to more open mobilization around Baltic 
nationalist claims.
Moscow’s miscalculations were also crucial for the success of the Baltic 
cause.  Gorbachev  had  underestimated  the  importance  of  nationalism  and 
ethnicity in the USSR, never recognizing it as a relevant concern in the SSRs 
(Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 46-47). Since his first declaration on nationalist issues 
in the USSR in 1986 and up until August 1989, Gorbachev had considered this 
issue a minor one (Smith, 1994b: 139).3 The Baltic States were also considered 
by Moscow as the ideal place to initiate the economic changes of perestroika, 
thus  supporting  the  most  reformist  elites  and  promoting  market-oriented 
reforms (Lane, 2001: 98). Moreover, he had supported the initial stages of the 
Popular Front struggles in the Baltic countries as he thought they would help 
him to fight  resistance to his reform plans from the old guard of the USSR 
Communist Party. However, the result was that,
“The  Baltic  republics  represented  a  paradox  for  Moscow  throughout  this 
transitional period. On the one hand, of all the Soviet republics it was Estonia, 
Latvia  and  Lithuania  that  were  envisaged  as  likely to  be  most  receptive  to 
perestroika. Indeed Gorbachev gave his blessing to the setting up of grassroots-
based movements in the region precisely because the Baltic was considered as 
the most likely flagship which the other republics would follow. Consequently, 
for the first time in half a century Baltic civil society was invited to participate 
in an experiment in socio-economic and political reform. On the other hand, it 
quickly became apparent to Moscow that the Baltic peoples wanted to go much 
further down the path to national self-determination than the centre’s reformers 
had envisaged or were prepared to allow. So underpinning this  paradox was 
Moscow’s  miscalculation  both  of  the  scale  of  national  feeling  in  the  least 
Sovietised of the republics and the effectiveness of a programme of reform that 
assumed  that  embarking  upon  economic  and  social  restructuring  would 
somehow  automatically  resolve  the  question  of  Baltic  national  self-
determination” (Smith, 1994b: 139).
The  disaster  at  the  Chernobyl  nuclear  power  station  in  April  1986  gave 
environmental concerns a central position in a Soviet Union more tolerant to the 
public expression of dissent. The Balts were also concerned about new large 
infrastructure investments in the region. Because of this the first stage of the 
struggle for independence was characterized by mobilizations with a focus on 
3 The lack of Gorbachev’s understanding of the national issue in the USSR was also clear to the 
Baltic elites. Gorbachev had visited Estonia in February 1987 to give a talk about the need to increase 
Russification in the Baltic SSRs and the deficit between Estonia and Russia, calling for increased pro -
duction in Estonia (Smith, 2001: 43-44).
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specific  issues  within  an  environmental  frame.  The  first  of  these  was  a 
mobilization  by  Tartu  University  students  against  the  threat  of  expanded 
phosphate mining in northern Estonia organized on August 23rd, 1987 (Raun, 
1997: 345). Throughout 1988 further environmental mobilizations emerged on 
different issues in both Latvia and Lithuania. However, in all three cases these 
mobilizations were backed up with nationalist concerns:
“At this particular stage, oppositional politics was usually of the single-issue 
type,  in  which  organized  opposition  was  mobilized  against  particular 
developmental  projects  which  carried,  in  particular,  environmental 
ramifications.  This  included  opposition  to  the  proposed  expansion  of  the 
Ignalina nuclear power station in Lithuania, plans to construct a hydroelectric 
power station on Latvia’s Daugava river, proposals to develop a phosphate plant 
in  northern  Estonia,  and  plans  to  construct  a  subway in  Riga.  Even  where 
oppositional politics seized upon other issues, such as those linked to human 
rights  or  religious  freedoms,  their  reference points  were  national  in  content. 
However,  despite  their  national  frame  of  reference,  overall  the  politics  and 
political actions in which civil society engaged were issue-specific with only 
limited inter-group co-ordination and organizational capability.  This in effect 
was a product of a society experimenting with the politics of the possible in 
which particular issues, actions and agendas were judged as less likely to result 
in  retribution  by  either  Moscow  or  the  local  party-state  machine”  (Smith, 
1994b: 129).
Environmental concerns in the Baltic countries were also linked to the fear of a 
new  and  massive  wave  of  Russian  immigration  to  build  and  operate  the 
resulting infrastructure (Beissinger, 2002: 168; Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 50-51). 
This would mean a continued decrease in the indigenous population (due to a 
combination  of  low birth  rates  among  Balts  and  massive  immigration  from 
Russia,  Belarus and Ukraine). This issue was seen by most Balts as crucial, 
since they believed that the very existence of ethnic Lithuanians, Latvians and 
Estonians  (as  well  as  their  languages)  would  be  extinguished  if  Moscow’s 
centralized decisions were not stopped (Lane, 2001: 94; Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 
52). As Eglitis (2008: 237) puts it: “the elevation of issues of nature and culture 
were  profoundly  symbolic:  it  can  be  argued  that  Soviet  destruction  of  the 
natural and cultural environments was perceived as symbolic of the destruction 
the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian nations themselves”.
In  addition,  there  were socioeconomic  grievances.  Despite  Latvia’s, 
Estonia’s and –to a lesser extent- also Lithuania’s economic successes, there 
was a perception in the three countries that they received much less than they 
gave to the USSR. For instance, production in Latvia had increased by 4600% 
compared to 1940, its GDP had increased by 1150% and labour productivity by 
1009%. Moreover, in 1985, the per capita consumption in the three Baltic SSRs 
was on average 12-28% higher than the rest of the Soviet Union (Pabriks and 
Purs, 2001: 49). This same grievance was also present in Estonia and Lithuania. 
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As a representative example of the grievance perceived in the three Baltic SSRs, 
the situation in Lithuania is described as follows: 
 “Lithuanians had been able to enjoy the fruits of rapid economic growth in the 
1960s. This put them and the other Baltic states at  the top of the economic 
ladder among Soviet republics. But, beginning in the 1970s and continuing into 
the 1980s, the rate of growth began to slow and shortages of goods in the shops 
became a regular feature of life. Food shortages were blamed on exports of food 
to other parts of the Soviet Union, raising charges of colonial exploitation by the 
center. Housing was also in short supply. The relative lack of consumer goods 
meant  that  there  was  too  little  to  buy  and  no  alternative  but  to  save. 
Consequently Lithuanian savings accounts were bulging. This situation caused 
frustration  rather  than  happiness,  showing  that  the  Soviet  economy  was 
incapable  of  achieving  a  steadily  improving  standard  of  living  for  all  its 
inhabitants.  At  the same time the gap between Lithuanian and Scandinavian 
standards  of  living  continued  to  widen.  For  many,  Soviet  control  was  just 
tolerable  if  the  economy  prospered.  If  not,  the  advantages  of  economic 
autonomy seemed increasingly appealing” (Lane, 2001: 94-95).
Glasnost’ policies  included the release of  several  political  prisoners between 
November 1986 and February 1987. As Beissinger (2002: 169) puts it: “In the 
second  half  of  1987  and  early  1988,  these  activists  organized  a  series  of 
demonstrations (known as ‘calendar demonstrations’) on the anniversaries of 
independence and occupation”. The first event of this kind was held on June 14, 
1987 when the  first  open protest  against  the  regime was organized.  On the 
anniversary of Stalin’s 1941 deportations, Latvian dissidents held a meeting at 
the Freedom Monument in Riga. There was no violent repression, but most of 
the activists were arrested. Later called “calendar demonstrations”, these events 
were  coordinated  again  on August  23rd,  1987  in  Tallinn  and  Vilnius  on  the 
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Lieven, 1994; Pabriks and Purs, 
2001).
Second stage:  the emergence of nationalist movements (1988-1989)  
The development of a nationalist consciousness implied a process of increased 
coordination.  This  process  started  in  Estonia  in  April  1988,  “when  a  joint 
meeting of the cultural unions expressed its lack of trust in the Estonian Party 
First  Secretary  Karl  Vaino  for  failing  to  defend  the  republic’s  interests 
adequately and called on the Communist Party, at its forthcoming Nineteenth 
Party  Conference,  to  define  the  meaning  of  ‘republican  sovereignty’ in  the 
Soviet  constitution”  (Beissinger,  2002:  170).  Later  on,  Edgar  Savisaar,  an 
Estonian  economist,  proposed  the  creation  of  a  movement  in  support  of 
perestroika  on  a  television  program.  This  movement,  called  Rahvarinne or 
Popular Front, was created in April 1988, and counted 40,000 members just six 
weeks after its creation (Beissinger, 2002: 171).
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The Popular  Front  model was diffused to Lithuania and Latvia by the 
Estonian leaders. The Popular Fronts in the three SSRs were promoted by local 
communist leaders, but the grassroots were built upon the organizations of the 
resistance period (Shtromas, 1994). In Lithuania, “At the end of May [1988], 
two emissaries from Estonia arrived in Vilnius, sharing information about the 
organization of the Estonian Popular Front. This coincided with the efforts by 
the  republican  party  leadership  to  stack  the  delegates  to  the  forthcoming 
Nineteenth Party Conference, provoking outrage among reform-minded party 
members” (Beissinger, 2002: 170). This led to the creation of the  Sajudis or 
Lithuanian  Popular  Front  on  June  3rd,  1988.  From  October,  the  Lithuanian 
Popular Front had additional support from the Lithuanian diaspora in the United 
States, which provided money, equipment and some access to journalists and 
government  officials  in  the  United  States  (Krickus,  1997:  296).  This 
international support was not reproduced in Estonia and Latvia.
In  Latvia  the  organization  of  a  Popular  Front  started  earlier  with  the 
Writers’ Union  demonstration  of  March  1988  to  commemorate  victims  of 
Stalin’s 1949 deportations. Latvia also had another organization –Helsinki 86- 
that  was already active in  the denunciation of  human rights  violations.  Two 
years earlier, “Three workers from the port of Liepaja in western Latvia founded 
Helsinki-86,  a  human  rights  watch  group.  The  group  declared  that  their 
objective was to “monitor how the economic, cultural, and individual rights of 
our people are respected. The organization consisted of about ten people, but its 
presence  made  KGB  panic.  The  group  was  placed  under  permanent 
surveillance. Repression and threats almost disrupted Helsinki-86’s call  for a 
popular  demonstration  to  commemorate  the  Soviet  deportations  of  Latvian 
citizens in June 1944” (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 52-53). On June 1st and 2nd the 
Writers’ Union  publicly  refused  the  Molotov-Ribbentrop  Pact.  In  October, 
Helsinki  86,  the  Writers’  Union  and  several  other  small  informal  groups 
organized the  Latvijas Tautas Fronte or  Latvian Popular Front (Lieven, 1994; 
Beissinger, 2002).
Since  their  respective  creations,  each  Popular  Front  coordinated  most 
national mobilizations. In Estonia, pro-independence mobilizations were carried 
out from February to September 1988. They started on February 2nd during a 
protest in Tartu commemorating the anniversary of the 1920 peace treaty that 
initiated the process of Estonian annexation to the USSR. As Smith (2001: 46) 
puts it: “Three weeks later, 10,000 people gathered in Tallinn to mark the 70 th 
anniversary  of  Estonian  independence.  As  the  authorities  again  sanctioned 
discussion of  the events  surrounding the birth  of  the Estonian Republic,  the 
Estonian Heritage Society publically displayed the still-prohibited flag of inter-
war  Estonia  in  Tartu  during  April”.  On  June  10th the  flag  was  widely  used 
among the 60,000 spectators at Tallinn’s song festival. This festival developed 
into  a  massive  expression  of  nationalist  sentiment  that  was  followed  by  a 
smaller  demonstration on June 14th (to  commemorate  the victims of  Stalin’s 
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deportations)  (Smith,  2001:  45-46).  This  series  of  events  led  to  Moscow’s 
decision to remove the old guard leader Karl Vaino on June 17th. The same day, 
150,000 people showed their happiness with this decision. His successor, Vaino 
Väljas, openly expressed his support for the demands for autonomy and initiated 
a series of reforms in that direction (Smith, 2001: 47). In September 1988, the 
Estonian language was declared the national language. This decision ended the 
contentious struggle for independence, and “from September 1988 the history of 
the  Estonian  independence  movement  is  primarily  an  institutional  history 
largely because of the widely shared and highly implicit  nature of  symbolic 
capital  surrounding  independence  and  the  relatively  swift  transformation  in 
public  discourse  that  overtook  local  party  and  government  institutions  as  a 
result” (Beissinger, 2002: 173). On November 16th, 1988 the Estonian Supreme 
Council declared the Estonian SSR’s independence.
In  Lithuania,  demonstrations  started  just  four  days  after  the  Estonian 
music  festival.  On  June  14th,  1988  a  demonstration  to  commemorate  the 
Lithuanian victims of Stalinism marked the first public event against the USSR 
authorities.  On June 24th,  the Popular  Front  organized its  first  major  protest 
against the Lithuanian Communist Party. As a consequence of these events, and 
in the same vein as in Estonia, Gorbachev decided to replace the old guard First 
Secretary  Ringaidas  Songaila  with  a  pro-Popular  Front  candidate,  Algirdas 
Brazauskas.  The  contentious  dimension  of  the  struggle  for  Lithuanian 
independence ended in September 1998, as in Estonia.
In Latvia, demonstrations organized by Helsinki 86 started in June 1988. 
These protests were much smaller than those coordinated by the Popular Fronts 
of Lithuania and Estonia, but they shared the rhetoric of secessionism. On June 
14th,  1987,  the  first  “calendar  demonstration”  was  organized  with  5,000 
participants  demonstrating  at  the  Monument  of  Freedom in  the  capital  city 
(Pabriks  and  Purs,  2001:  53).  In  the  case  of  Latvia,  elite  support  was  less 
straightforward due to Russian ethnic counter-mobilizations. However, Latvian 
organizations  were  multiplying  in  the  struggle  for  independence  with  the 
creation of the Latvian National Independence Movement in November. This 
organization called for a more radical and quick independence of Latvia from 
the USSR (Plakans, 1997: 256).
These  events  unfolded  so  quickly  that  Gorbachev’s  government  was 
unable to respond with the necessary speed. While mobilizations were growing 
and  the  diffusion  of  nationalist  mobilizations  expanded  from  July  1988  to 
September 1989, Gorbachev called without success for a response to the claims 
with a reformulation of the USSR as a federation of autonomous SSRs or with 
economic decentralization. He was not able to propose any solution,  and by 
1989 nationalist  movements were already consolidated in their independence 
struggles both in the Baltics and elsewhere in the USSR (Beissinger, 2002: 92-
93).
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Third stage: the collapse of the USSR and the achiev  ement of independence   
(1988-1991)
The third and final stage in the secessionist movement started around June 1988 
after  a  series  of  events  contributed to  the decisive  breakdown of the Soviet 
empire. The first of these were the first semi-competitive elections for the USSR 
Congress of Peoples Deputies in March, which opened an institutional space of 
access to the parliament pro-independence Baltic groups. The second event was 
the Tbilisi massacre of April 9th, which showed the limits of massive violent 
repression,  and  was  the  last  of  its  kind.  The  third  was  the  1989-1990 
generalization  of  nationalist  and  ethnic  struggles  across  the  USSR,  which 
debilitated Moscow and provided the Baltic nationalists with a more favourable 
correlation of power (Smith, 1994b). Within this setting the Russian elites began 
to accept the independence of the Baltic SSRs as inevitable (Beissinger, 2002: 
85-87).
In Lithuania, the radical flank of the pro-independence movement was 
created  after  a  protest  on  February  16th,  1988.  “The  [Lithuanian  Freedom 
League]  LFL was  against  participating  in  elections  to  ‘illegitimate’ Soviet 
institutions since participation meant collaboration with the occupier. Sajudis, 
on the other hand, believed in using existing institutions to further the cause of 
reform. Most Lithuanians agreed with them. However, in the course of the next 
two years the moderate reformers and even the great majority of the Communist 
Party of Lithuania (CPL) were pushed to the right by events,  and ultimately 
accepted the LFL’s independence programme though not his uncompromising 
refusal  to  cooperate  with  communists”  (Lane,  2001:  99).  Violent  police 
repression suffered by both coalitions during a protest on September 28 th, 1988 
pushed the unification of the LFL and the Popular Front in a pro-independence 
struggle  through  moderate  means.  Repression  during  that  protest  was 
interpreted by both sectors as an attempt by the old guard of the CPL to regain 
control of power (Lane, 2001: 102).  There was no more repression by local 
security forces after this time.
In  Latvia  a  similar  situation  occurred  on  June  17th when  the  Latvian 
National  Independence  Movement  (LNIM)  was  founded  as  the  social 
movement organization calling for independence without any negotiations with 
Russia. The LNIM was the second biggest organization in the country, but far 
behind  the  250,000  members  of  the  Latvian  Popular  Front.  However,  the 
dynamics of the three Baltic SSRs led to the unification of claims and methods 
in Latvia under the leadership of the Popular Front, after the same fashion as 
Lithuania (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 54).
On  January  18th,  1989  the  Estonian  Supreme  Council  passed  a  law 
declaring Estonian the official national language. This produced a brief counter-
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movement of Russians denouncing discrimination, but no changes were made to 
the law during the struggles for independence. In addition, a division emerged 
within the Estonian Communist Party (ECP). Named Interdvizheine, this sector 
of the ECP was led by the old guard, which refused glasnost’ and perestroika. 
However small and limited the mobilizational capacity of this faction, it could 
control the ECP by imposing its stance within the national politburo, thereby 
causing a split  in that body in March. The ECP organized one or two small 
counter-mobilizations and one large one in cooperation with the United Council 
of Work Collectives. On March 14th, around 50,000 Russian speakers assembled 
in Tallinn to demand the restoration of the Soviet Estonian flag and refuse the 
imposition of Estonian as the national language (Smith, 2001: 48-49).
As in Lithuania and Latvia, a second pro-independence social movement 
organization emerged in Estonia in February 1989, and called for immediate 
independence without any negotiation with Moscow. As Raun (1997: 346) puts 
it: “the Estonian Citizens’ Committees, appeared on the scene, backed by the 
Estonian National Independence Party, the Estonian Heritage Society (founded 
in December 1987 for the purpose of reconnecting Estonians with a history they 
had  been  increasingly  cut  off  from  under  Soviet  rule),  and  the  Estonian 
Christian Union. The Citizens’ Committees, representing the right wing of the 
emerging Estonian political spectrum, feared that the Popular Front would make 
too many concessions to Moscow and the existing authorities”. The Citizens’ 
Committees,  new and  smaller  organizations,  questioned  the  Popular  Front’s 
more moderate strategy of gradual negotiations working towards independence. 
As  a  consequence,  the  Popular  Front  publicly  endorsed  the  claim  for  full 
independence in October 1989. As a result, from December 1989 to March 1990 
the Citizens’ Committees and the Popular Front disputed over who would lead 
the struggle and had the best strategy towards Moscow. Because of Gorbachev’s 
refusal to discuss Estonian independence or autonomy under any terms, both 
organizations  started  to  cooperate  with  each  other,  with  the  Popular  Front 
becoming the leader (Raun, 1997).
A last counter-mobilization was organized without success. On May 15th, 
1989 a crowd of 5,000 people attempted to restore the Soviet Estonian flag to 
the building of the Supreme Council, and in response (after a Popular Front call 
on the radio) around 15,000 people took to the streets to defend the parliament. 
The protest ended without violence (Smith, 2001: 57).
Just  three days after  the Estonian counter-mobilization,  the Lithuanian 
Supreme  Council  passed  a  declaration  of  sovereignty,  and  on  May  31st the 
Latvian Popular Front called for complete independence. On July 27 th, in a late 
reaction,  the  Supreme  Soviet  in  Moscow  accepted  Baltic  economic  self-
management as proposed by Estonia one year before (Smith, 2001).
The most massive mobilization of the whole struggle was a two-million-
strong  human  chain  organized  by  the  three  Popular  Fronts  together  and 
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connecting the capital cities of the three Baltic countries on August 26th, 1989. 
This  impressive  act  of  unity  and  power  (the  total  population  of  the  three 
countries  was  around  five  million!)  represented  a  massive  refusal  of  the 
legitimacy of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which gave the Baltic Countries to 
the USSR in 1939. Immediately after this human chain, the Supreme Soviets of 
the  three  republics  declared  their  incorporation  in  the  USSR  as  illegal.  In 
December 1989 the Congress of Peoples Deputies declared the secret protocols 
of  the  Molotov-Ribbentrop  Pact  illegal.  Soon  after  this  protest,  Moscow 
recognized that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact indeed had some secret protocols 
concerning the transfer of the Baltic States to the USSR (Lieven, 1994; Smith, 
1994b).  From that  point  on,  the  struggle  for  separatism became  a  cause  of 
national self-determination. As Smith wrote (1994b: 133), “Theirs was ‘a lawful 
struggle’ against  ‘occupation’ by  a  ‘foreign power’.  In  short,  the  nationalist 
cause could appeal to rectificatory justice further legitimized by an international 
community, including the United States, who had never officially acknowledged 
their  de  jure  incorporation  into  the  Soviet  Union.  Once  Moscow  had 
acknowledged this fact, emphasis shifted from the struggle for autonomy within 
the Soviet federation to demands for the restoration of independent statehood”. 
The first institutional reaction came from Estonia. On November 12th the 
Estonian Supreme Council declared the Soviet annexation illegal. In Lithuania, 
in a clear signal of autonomy, the Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself 
independent  from the USSR Communist  Party  on December  19th,  1989.  On 
March  11th,  1990  Lithuania  declared  its  independence,  notwithstanding 
Gorbachev’s visit to Lithuania in January 1990, and the later economic embargo 
and halt in shipments of oil to Lithuania. Lithuania seemed isolated when, on 
April  26th,  France,  Germany  and  the  United  States  asked  the  country  to 
reconsider its decision in a joint international appeal, and its independence was 
not recognized by these countries (Lane, 2001: 109-110). In parallel, Estonia 
(on  March  30th)  and  Latvia  (on  May  4th)  also  declared  their  independence 
(Krickus, 1997; Plakans, 1997; Raun, 1997).
However, due to Moscow’s economic blockade of Lithuania, the country 
had to accept a moratorium on the declaration of independence on June 29 th, 
1990.  Fruitless  negotiations  were  carried  out  between  Russia  and  the  three 
Baltic  countries  until  December.  Then,  on  January  12th,  1991,  Estonia  and 
Russia  signed  an  agreement  recognizing  each  others’  sovereignty.  In  the 
meantime, two pro-Soviet paramilitary attacks had taken place. The first was in 
Vilnius,  where  troops  under  USSR command seized  the  TV tower  and city 
centre,  killing 15 people on January 13th.  Second, in Riga,  troops under  the 
command of the ECP old guard attacked the TV station building and killed 
some civilians on January 20th. The same day, units attacked Latvia’s Ministry 
of the Interior. Expecting a military attack from Moscow, the Popular Fronts and 
local  governments  called  on  the  civil  population  to  organize  barricades  in 
defence of the state institutions in the three capitals,  mobilizing hundreds of 
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thousands of armed civilians for two weeks (Lane, 2001; Plakans, 1997: 257; 
Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 62-64). However, the feared blow from Moscow never 
fell.
On  February  9th,  1991  Lithuania  called  for  a  referendum  on 
independence, which resulted in 85% support (Krickus, 1997: 300). On March 
3rd, Latvia and Estonia organized similar referenda with results of 73.7% and 
77.8% for independence respectively (Raun, 1997: 347; Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 
64;  Eglitis,  2008:  240).  Moscow  attempted  to  react  with  a  pro-Soviet 
referendum on March 18th,  but this was boycotted in the three countries. On 
August 19th, 1991 a coup against Gorbachev by conservative actors within the 
party was stopped by Boris Yeltsin. These threatening developments in Russian 
led to the quick unification of all pro-independence organizations and one day 
later  the Latvian and Estonian Supreme Councils declared full  independence 
(Raun, 1997: 348-349; Smith, 2001: 55-56). In the following weeks the three 
countries were recognized by the international community as sovereign states 
and admitted  to  the  United  Nations.  The democratic  institutions  of  the  pre-
Soviet period were quickly restored as a result of common agreement among 
elites and the population over the need to return to the institutional setting of the 
independent period.  Finally, on September 6th, 1991 the Soviet State Council 
recognized the Baltic States’ independence (Smith, 2001: 60).
Structural conditions
The  Baltic  countries  annexation  into  the  USSR  was  bloodless.  The  three 
countries were forced to accept treaties of mutual agreement with the USSR in 
October 1939. These treaties were a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 
August 1939 that defined the Baltic States as part of the USSR (Eglitis, 2008; 
Smith-Sivertsen, 2010).
During Stalin’s mandate they suffered persecution similar to other Soviet 
Republics, while receiving high investments for industrialization (in Estonia and 
Latvia,  though  not  in  Lithuania).  After  Stalinism,  the  Baltics  changed 
substantially:
“Restrictions on cultural and social life were less stringent than before, though 
these areas were still  controlled.  In terms of economic life, the Baltics were 
considered among the most ‘prosperous’ republics of the USSR: they had better 
access to consumer goods and a generally higher standard of living. While, on 
the face of it, this was a positive development for the Baltic republics, it made 
them a magnet  for more migration from other republics,  further  shifting the 
demographics and driving the titular population, particularly in Latvia, closer to 
minority status. One prominent consequence of this was linguistic: while most 
Balts  learned  and  spoke  fluent  Russian,  few  Russians  learned  republic 
languages. The 1970 census in the Latvian SSR, for instance, showed that over 
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half  of  Latvians  (and  a  higher  proportion  in  younger  generations)  spoke 
Russian;  however,  less  than a  fifth  of  ethnic Russians  in  the  republic  could 
speak Latvian” (Eglitis, 2008: 236).
This decline of the native population was most acute in Estonia and Latvia due 
to  higher  investment  in  industrialization,  unlike  the  more  rural  Lithuania. 
Estonians in Estonia accounted for 88.2% of the population in 1934, but just 
65.7% in 1979, and even less in 1989 (61.5%) (Raun, 1997: 335: table 9.1). In 
Latvia, this issue was equally relevant for locals. The Latvian ethnic population 
in Latvia had decreased from 77% in 1935 to 52% in 1989, while the Russian 
population grew from 8.8% in 1935 to 34% in 1989, followed by 4.5% from 
Belarus, 3.5% from Ukraine, and 2.3% from Poland in the same year (Plakans, 
1997: 249, table 7.2). In other words, Latvians made up just half of the local 
population.  In  a  different  pattern  to  its  neighbours,  the  less  industrialized 
Lithuania had no problems in this respect. Lithuanians represented 81.4% of the 
population in 1995, with two main minority groups: Russians (8.4%) and Poles 
(7%) (Krickus, 1997: 320, table 8.6).
Cleavages
During the transitional period, the main cleavage according to Eglitis (2008: 
241) was between those in favour of the restoration of the pre-Soviet period 
institutions and those in favour of the establishment of new institutions. This 
issue divided the elites throughout the transition, and finally those in favour of 
the restoration of pre-Soviet institutions imposed their reform program.
Since independence (and democratization) new cleavages have emerged. 
In Latvia and Estonia, according to Smith-Sivertsen (2010: 456), since 1990 
“The  disadvantaged  strata  versus  the  managing,  occupational  elites  is  an 
emerging cleavage...”. According to Whitefield (2002), the main cleavages are 
different in each country. In Estonia, they were organized around: 1. ethnicity 
(between Russians and the others); 2. age (between those who had lived under 
Communism and the new generation); and 3. class (based on an urban-rural 
distinction). In Latvia, they concerned: 1. ethnicity (between Latvians and all 
the non-Latvians, including a religious component); and 2. education and class 
(between urban professionals and rural populations and urban workers). Finally, 
in Lithuania they coalesced around: 1. ethnicity (between Russians and Poles, 
and  Lithuanians);  2.  religious  (between  Roman  Catholics  and  Russian 
Orthodox); and 3. class (between liberal professionals and the working class). 
Finally,  according to Choe (2003: 85-86),  the cleavages in the countries  are 
partially  similar  to  those  identified  by  Whitefield,  yet  more  complex  and 
dynamic:
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“In Estonia, differences in stands on issues are clearly found regarding three 
socioeconomic categories, i.e. age, urban-rural and income, while the remaining 
four cleavages, i.e. gender, ethnicity, education and class, are believed not to be 
so important regarding issue perceptions.  The religiosity variable is the only 
weak  cleavage  scored  high  regarding  two  issues  –the  citizenship  issue  and 
joining NATO. In Latvia, the pattern of relationship between social structure 
and  the  seven  major  issues  seems  to  be  quite  different  from that  found  in 
Estonia, where three cleavages are seen as dormant conflict lines.  In Latvia, 
gender shows the most marked difference in stands on issues. Four cleavages –
age,  ethnicity,  urban-rural and class- mark high scores regarding four issues. 
Ethnic cleavage is clearly seen regarding such integration issues as citizenship, 
joining NATO and the EU. Our empirical data confirm that Latvian society is 
deeply  split  on  the  integration  and  harmony  issue  between  Latvians  and 
Russians.  Ethnic tension could be a  potential  source of domestic  conflict  in 
Latvia. In Lithuania, the eight cleavages proved to be of no importance in policy 
perceptions. In Lithuania, however, the EU and NATO issues were found to be a 
dormant conflict source. Five cleavage groups were scored high on these issues, 
which would imply that the Lithuanian people are deeply split regarding access 
to Western Europe. The Lithuanian people are divided regarding the security 
issue dealing with the potential military threat of Russia”.
Actors in the transitions I: the elites
Local elites in the three Baltic countries were supportive of the secessionist 
claims and the Popular Fronts, while elites in Moscow were neither prone to 
repression, nor to accepting these claims for independence. Because the process 
was led by neo-communists and non-communists together within a nationalist 
frame  there  were  no  anti-communist  elites  or  movements.  In  other  words, 
because the enemy was agreed to be external to the Baltic countries (i.e., the 
authorities in Moscow), there was no internal persecution of local supporters of 
the USSR. Finally, while the Catholic Church was a very relevant actor in the 
resistance period in Lithuania, no religious organizations played a significant 
role in the other two Baltic states.
The military and the secret police
The secret police played no role, while Soviet military and paramilitary troops 
carried out two brief and failed armed interventions in Vilnius and Riga in 1991, 
as already described. Remaining counter-mobilizations were organized by the 
Russian minority and/or the old guard of the Communist Parties in each of the 
Baltic States.
The churches
Only  in  Lithuania  was  a  religious  organization  relevant  in  the  struggle  for 
independence. The Catholic Church of Lithuania can be considered one of the 
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main organizations of the resistance to Moscow’s decisions concerning civic 
and cultural rights. 
The  Catholic  Church  was  very  important  in  building  the  ecumenical 
Lithuanian Helsinki Watch Group in 1975, and in campaigning for the respect 
of  human rights  in  the  SSR (Lane,  2001:  90-91).  Concerning  the  diaspora, 
“About  35,000  Lithuanians  settled  in  the  United  States  (another  15,000  in 
Canada), joining a Lithuanian-American community which had first arrived in 
the nineteenth century. In 1940, members of the first wave of immigration had 
lobbied  President  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt  not  to  recognize  the  Soviet 
occupation  of  the  Baltic  states,  and  they  later  helped  reverse  a  war-time 
agreement which returned Lithuanian displaced persons to the USSR” (Krickus, 
1997: 294).
From  1968  onwards  the  main  protests  of  the  resistance  period  in 
Lithuania  were  promoted  by  catholic  activists  due  to  the  centrality  of  the 
Catholic Church, (Remeikis, 1980). There were permanent requests for respect 
of the freedom of conscience, which in 1968 led to a petition signed by 17,054 
Lithuanian Roman Catholics. In 1971 this was sent to USSR diplomats through 
a  delegation  at  the  United  Nations  (Shtromas,  1994:  116,  n.  41).  This  was 
followed  by  another  petition  in  1973  with  similar  calls  for  respect  of  the 
freedom  of  conscience,  and  yet  another  huge  effort  in  1979  with  150,000 
signatures against the Soviet government’s decision to use Klaipeda’s church for 
non-religious purposes (Lane, 2001: 126, n. 4).
According  to  Girnius  (1999:  63):  “The  leading  role  of  the  Catholic 
Church in the dissident movement during the 1970s and 1980s bears witness to 
the poverty of Lithuanian civil society under Soviet Rule. The Church became a 
haven for dissidents by default because it was the only organization free from 
government  control.  Defenders  of  human and national  minority  rights,  even 
those of an anti-clerical bent, eventually gravitated to the Church because they 
could find comfort and support nowhere else”. In a more positive vision of the 
role of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, Lane (2001: 92) considers it the main 
mobilizing  organization  during  this  period  because:  “The  key  to  achieving 
working-class  participation  was  religion,  and  it  was  the  Catholic  rights 
movement which above all distinguished Lithuanian dissent from other dissent 
groups in the Soviet Union”.
I  ntellectuals  
Intellectuals were relevant during the resistance period, and after the cycle of 
pro-independence mobilizations began local intelligentsia in the three countries 
became key actors. The intelligentsia coordinated the Popular Fronts in support 
of independence, and pro-Soviet intellectuals coordinated the brief paramilitary 
attacks of 1991.
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Actors in the transition II: civil society
The mainstream perspective is that  civil  society was crucial  and very active 
from the resistance  period onwards  in  the  three Baltic  states.  However,  this 
differs by country. The common denominator among the three states was the 
role of the Popular Fronts as the main actor in both contentious and routine 
politics:  that  is  to say that  the Popular  Fronts  coordinated and led the main 
mobilizations as well as all the political negotiations with Moscow and other 
external actors during the struggle for independence. 
The Popular Fronts
The main coalitions in the struggle for independence were the Popular Fronts. 
The  Popular  Fronts  were  created  in  the  Baltic  SSRs  and  later  imitated  in 
Ukraine,  Armenia  and  Georgia.  The  Baltic  and  non-Baltic  Popular  Fronts 
coordinated  their  actions  in  all  these  SSRs,  and  had  some  contacts  with 
dissidents  in  Moscow  (Beissinger,  2002:  83-84).  The  Popular  Fronts  were 
coalitions  of  environmental  and  cultural  social  movement  organizations, 
religious  groups,  the  Catholic  Church,  neo-communist  elites  and  dissident 
groups organized by local  intelligentsia  profiting from glasnost’ to revitalize 
their reform agendas. As Beissinger (2002: 98) explains: “In Estonia, half of the 
106 members of the leadership of the Estonian Popular Front were Communist 
Party  members.  In  Latvia,  thirty  percent  of  the  participants  in  the  founding 
congress of the Latvian Popular Front were communists, whereas over half of 
the delegates to the founding conference of Interfront, the movement organized 
in 1989 to protect the rights of non-Latvians in Latvia, were Communist Party 
members”.  Claims  for  autonomy  were  intimately  related  to  the  Baltics 
communist parties’ agenda within the USSR and the perestroika and glasnost’ 
reforms offered them an opportunity to openly express them (Smith,  1994b: 
130).
The first Popular Front was created in Estonia, and almost immediately 
imitated by the other two Baltic countries. Although they played a similar role 
as  the  moderate  flanks  of  the secessionist  movements,  there  were important 
differences among them:
“In Estonia, the front was called Rahvarinne, in Latvia Latvijas Tautas Fronte 
(LTF) and in Lithuania it was called Sajudis. Rahvarinne was mostly centrist 
already in the beginning, having a big independence movement outside it (to the 
right of Rahvarinne) organizing the citizens’ committees (representing pre-war 
citizens and their descendants). To the south of Estonia LTF was by contrast 
very encompassing, probably because the small Latvian ethnical majority in the 
republic made it hard to achieve two-thirds majority in the republic soviet for 
independence. The Lithuanian Sajudis was more right-leaning than left-leaning 
in 1990, since the bulk of the communists in Lithuania supported independence 
already  while  remaining  a  unified  group  in  a  reformed  party  (LDDP 
22
[Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania]) led by Algirdas Mykolas Brazauskas” 
(Smith-Sivertsen, 2010: 452).
Even  though  the  Popular  Fronts  were  crucial  in  the  mobilizations  for 
independence  and  in  the  first  months  of  independence,  “...  after  1991  the 
remnants of these fronts did not find similar placements inside the new party 
systems that  emerged in  the  post-transition  parliamentary  elections”  (Smith-
Sivertsen, 2010: 452), and they have since disappeared.
M  inority counter-movements  
The only counter-movements to emerge during the process remained very small. 
In the three Baltic countries, small movements mobilized to represent the needs 
of the smaller ethnic groups, who felt that the claims for nationalist changes 
threatened their survival  and/or privileges.  These movements emerged in the 
first phase of the secessionist struggle, and in no case did they evolve into major 
counter-movements:
“The ascendancy of ethnic nationalism however had a further reactive effect 
among minorities within all three republics, formalized in late 1988 with the 
establishment  of  Russian  dominated  counter-movements.  At  the  Founding 
Congress  of  the  Estonian  counter-movement,  Interdvizheine,  held  in  March 
1989, delegates complained about the “Estonianization of Soviet Estonia” and 
in  particular  of  language  and  citizenship  laws  which  threatened  their  social 
marginalization.  Similar  fears  of  “nativization”  were  voiced  by  counter-
movements  in  Latvia  (Interfront)  and  in  Lithuania  (Yedinstvo)  where  the 
republics’ large  Polish  majority  were  also  active.  Unlike  the  popular  fronts 
however,  support  for  the  counter-movements  was  more  limited,  both  to 
particular places (especially strong in the large industrial cities and in north-east 
Estonia where Russians comprised over four-fifths of the population) and to 
particular social strata (blue-collar workers, army officers, economic managers, 
party apparatchiks)” (Smith, 1994b: 135-136).
Within  this  context,  only  the  Russian  minority  in  Latvia  represented  an 
important percentage of the population and was slightly more organized than its 
Estonian (Russian minority) and Lithuanian (Polish minority) counterparts.
Environmental and cultural movements
The emergence of nationalist struggles was related to the openings of glasnost’, 
which made it less risky to protest about cultural and environmental issues. For 
this  reason  the  first  stage  of  the  protests  were  framed  as  environmental 
concerns.  However,  these  concerns  had nationalist  overtones.  Moreover,  the 
actors mobilizing in this period were the same ones that would later create the 
Popular Fronts.  In Lithuania,  for  example,  “...  a  decision in 1967 to replace 
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thousands of farmsteads with new rural settlements generated intense discussion 
about  the  impact  of  such  radical  change  on  the  identity  and  traditions  of 
Lithuanian people, particularly since the purest forms of Lithuanian architecture 
were believed to be found in rural areas” (Lane, 2001: 92).
While environmental movements were less relevant in Estonia, in Latvia 
the situation was similar to that in Lithuania: in 1986 a small group of artists, 
intellectuals and artisans organized a campaign to restore rural churches. This 
campaign led to the creation of the Environment Protection Club, a nationalist 
and environmentalist social movement organization. This group later grew and 
“In 1986, when Soviet authorities planned to construct a hydroelectric complex 
on the Daugava River close to Daugavpils, a sudden wave of fierce opposition 
led by Latvian intellectuals and greens appeared” (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 52). 
The  most  relevant  campaign  of  environmental  movements  in  Latvia  was 
organized
“In October 1986, [when] the young journalist Dainis Ivans and his computer 
specialist  colleague  Arturs  Snips  published  an  article  in  the  cultural  journal 
Literatura  un  Maksla  (Literature  and  Art).  They  raised  cultural  and 
environmental issues about the dam, as well as questioning the economic logic 
of the massive, long-planned project. Their point of view was quickly supported 
by more than 700 letters and 30,000 signatures sent by the population at large to 
the journal. Facing such unexpected popular resistance, the USSR’s Council of 
Ministers cancelled the project” (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 52). 
Since  the  awakening of  the  pro-independence  Popular  Fronts  in  1987-1988, 
these movements abandoned their environmental claims and took part in the 
general struggle for secession.
Conclusion
The intense resistance to the USSR and the struggle for independence in the 
Baltic  States  was  a  by-product  of  a  pro-autonomy  struggle.  However,  the 
transition to democracy in the Baltic States was not specifically sought out. A 
possible explanation for this could be that representative democracy became an 
implicit and obvious ideal regime for the elites and local populations. This could 
be  a  result  of  the  Eastern  European  context  of  democratization  and  the 
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian experiences of 50 years of rule by a strong 
authoritarian empire.  In any case,  there were no movements in favour of or 
against democracy, and representative democracy was simply a by-product of 
the  achievement  of  independence  that  led  to  the  restoration  of  pre-Soviet 
institutions in the three countries.
As  for  the  successes  of  the  independence  movements  in  the  Baltic 
countries, five crucial events paved the way for independence as the only exit 
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strategy for  the Baltic  SSRs.  First,  Gorbachev promoted the mobilization of 
civil society, expecting support for his reform program, but miscalculating the 
relevance of nationalism for the Soviet Republics. Second, after mobilization 
had become widespread, Gorbachev lost the opportunity to build the USSR as a 
confederation because he refused to accept that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
was  illegal.  Third,  this  issue,  plus  the  failure  of  attempts  to  repress 
mobilizations, led to the increased unification among all the mobilized sectors, 
in  turn  leading  to  the  two-million-strong  human  chain.  Fourth,  the  first 
multiparty elections in the Baltic countries saw a clear majority support the pro-
independence  groups,  allowing  for  a  quick  and  institutionalized  process  of 
secession.  Finally,  after  the  failed  coup  against  Gorbachev  the  project  of  a 
voluntary federation collapsed, making independence a  de jure fact since the 
correlation of power favoured Yeltsin’s decentralization model.
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